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In our society, we assume that people have freedomwithin a realm of decision.
In other words, the viewis that we cannot control everything around us, butgiven
our circumstances, we have choice. For example,almost everyone assumes that
humans cannot choose tobe immortal. However, we also assume that we canchoose
between using narcotics, or not usingnarcotics. I do not believe that the
standard view onfree will is correct. Instead, I believe that ouractions are
beyond the control of our consciousness.
Should one have a peach, or a
piece of chocolate cake?The uncontrollable factors are not limited to theitems
being offered. The response to this choice isalso determined by an
individual^Òs personal taste infood, how they prioritize health, and how value
thepresent against the future. Life experience andgenetics control these
personal factors. Withsophisticated instruments, perhaps we could evendiscover
exactly how these factors influence adecision.
But what of the randomness
of the sub-atomic world ofquantum physics? At the most basic level, particles
donot follow normal physical law. Instead, certainthings happen without definite
reason. Surely one mustconsider it an argument against determinism.Proponents of
free will would say that thisuncertainty leaves room for true choice. There
isdisagreement about whether or not what we perceive tobe random is not
determined. Somewould say that it is just part of a largerpredetermined pattern
which cannot be observed by merehumans. If this were true, there would be
absolutelyno room for free will.
However, let us assume that there is
true randomnessinvolved in the workings of the universe. Some wouldargue that
the randomness^Ò is actually our will powerat work. They think that the
deviation from Newtonianmechanics is where our humanity lies. I would like
topoint out that despite the fact that free will inquantum mechanics is a
possibility, it may very wellbe untrue anyway. Perhaps randomness is simply what
itappears to be: randomness. Let us return to the choicebetween the peach and
the cake. Would there be morefree will involved if there was a random, 1:2
chancethat the peach would be chosen? The inevitable answerto this question is
^Ñno^Ò. True, complete randomness isno more conducive to free will than
determinism.
There still exists the possibility that therandomness is our
free will at work. I must offer thefollowing argument: wouldn^Òt well informed,
rationalpeople with "free will" always make the right choice(consequently
lacking free will anyway)? That is, ifsomeone makes a choice with valid reason,
the choiceis ^Ñright.^Ò A path of valid reasoning will alwaysyield the same
conclusion. If someone makes a choicewith invalid reasons, chances are, the
choice is^Ñwrong.^Ò However, one cannot be blamed for making achoice with
invalid reasons. Holding one responsiblefor faulty logic is equivalent to
holding oneresponsible for bad math skills. Are there otherpossible explanations
for decisions? We may againrefer to quantum physics; perhaps some actions have
nocause. We cannot conceive of holding one responsiblefor an decision that has
no cause.
Now we have three possible explanations for behavior,valid
reasons, invalid reasons, and randomness. Onedoes not choose to be influenced
invalid reasons orrandomness. In order for someone to make a choice,they have to
have more than one option. If one doesnot have control over whether or not their
choices areinfluenced by invalid reasons or randomness, theycannot have control
over whether or not their choicesare made by valid reasons.
A strong
argument for free will is that it seemsintuitive. We feel as though we have it.
My defenseagainst this claim is that intuitive belief in freewill is necessary
for survival. Humans would not havesurvived natural selection without feeling as
thoughthey were free. We need to feel free in order tobehave in certain positive
ways. We need not actuallybe free. Feeling free and being free are two
verydifferent things. In this instance, biased humanintuition cannot yield true
results with certainty.
Since we must act as though people are
responsible, wemust set rules for action. Even though people are notresponsible
for their actions, in figuring blame incertain cases, we must use the current
popularconception of free will. The idea of ^Ñchoosing^Ò tobehave in certain
ways certainly sounds strange if oneassumes lack of free will. This paradox is
hard toreconcile from a human perspective. Nevertheless, Ican appeal to my above
statement: we areevolutionarily demanded to feel as though we have freewill,
even if we don^Òt. Given that it is natural tofeel as though we have free will,
it only makes senseto speak as though we do. In reality, we may oftenbehave as
though we have free will; to satisfy naturalinclinations, and to behave in ways
that are conduciveto better future behavior. Only in certain situations,such as
those in which retributive punishment is beingargued must we remember our lack
of free will. In thismanner, we can act morally. |
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